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THE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A
CONSERVATIVE JURISPRUDENCE PROTECTING
THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
TIMOTHY L. FORT*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The first words of the Bill of Rights protect the right of individuals
to practice their religion freely, but recent Supreme Court opinions cast
doubt about the level of protection that will be offered to the faith of
minorities. Few minorities have been so threatened as Native Americans.
To say the rights of Native Americans have been ignored throughout
American history is to say nothing new. Pushed across the continent,
and killed or rounded up and deposited onto reservations, Native Americans have not fared well under American jurisprudence.' Few could have
predicted, however, how the free exercise of Native American religion
would become the focus of contemporary Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence.
Part II of this article will describe the background of the Free Exercise
Clause. It will focus on how the United States Supreme Court has applied
the clause to religious minorities, particularly Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Amish. It will also consider the Court-created exemptions
which allow individuals to claim entitlements even though their religious
practices force them to fail a requirement for the receipt of those benefits.
This part provides the necessary context for considering the decisions
affecting Native Americans which impact on Free Exercise jurisprudence.
Part III will describe three significant Supreme Court cases from the
past six years which significantly erode the rights of Native Americans
to practice their religion freely. These cases systematically refuse to
acknowledge the importance of the spiritual essence of Native American
belief, the sacredness of lands that are a part of Native American faith,
and the use of hallucinogenic drugs as part of sacramental worship
services. This part of the article will suggest that the freedom of Native
Americans to practice their religion is not theoretically eliminated; however, Court decisions create significant obstacles. This part will also
address the interpretive jurisprudence practiced by the Supreme Court in
these decisions.

* Lecturer in Socio-Legal Studies, Loyola University of Chicago. The author would like to
acknowledge the assistance of Steven Blair in the preparation of this article.
1. See John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native Americans,
52 MONT. L. REV. 13 (1991).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

Part IV uses these issues to address the prospects for Native Americans
to practice their religion freely. This part will consider arguments that
may be consistent with the jurisprudential approach adopted by the Court.
While it is fine to criticize Supreme Court decisions, one must be realistic
to see if the goals of the First Amendment can be protected within the
Supreme Court's contemporary framework.
Certainly, the stakes are enormous. They are enormous for Native
Americans because they have been directly affected by Supreme Court
decisions which limit their ability to practice religion. Of even broader
concern, however, is the potential effect these limitations might have
upon other minorities and, ultimately, upon the constitutional rights of
all Americans.
II.

HISTORY OF THE APPLICATION OF THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE

A.

A Brief Review of Free Exercise Jurisprudence
In the last thirty years, the primary controversy concerning the Religion
Clauses 2 has centered on the Establishment Clause.' The Court has had,
and continues to have, a difficult time determining exactly how a government can treat a particular religion or religion generally. Aid to
parochial schools and the incorporation of religious practices by public
schools 4 and other curriculum and religious observances' have received
the most attention. Tax exemptions, 6 religious displays (particularly at
holiday seasons), 7 and others 8 have also received the Court's consideration.

2. By this I mean both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment of the Constitution.
3. This controversy continues this year in Supreme Court cases concerning prayer at public
school graduation ceremonies, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), and the presence of religious
symbols in governmental seals, Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992); Kuhn v. City of Rolling Meadows, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992).
4. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); School Dist.
of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v.
Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1972); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370
(1930).
5. See Edwards v. Aguilar, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1962); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
6. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
7. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
8. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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Continued attention is likely as the Court seems willing to modify or
discard its twenty-year-old Establishment Clause test, 9 but now rivalling
the Establishment Clause controversy is the Free Exercise controversy.
To understand why the rights of Native Americans are threatened, one
must understand how the Supreme Court has treated the Free Exercise
rights of other religious minorities. To do that, this article will first
sketch the Court's treatment of the Mormons, the Jehovah's Witnesses,
and the Amish. To understand fully the Free Exercise controversy involving Native Americans, this part will conclude with a description of
the Court's treatment of Free Exercise claims to unemployment benefits.
1. The Mormon Cases
The Supreme Court's first real encounter with the Free Exercise Clause
concerned laws which prohibited polygamy in the late nineteenth century.
Members of the Church of Latter Day Saints (the Mormons) not only
practiced polygamy, but believed that the failure to do so would lead
to their eternal damnation. Two key cases raised the question of whether
Mormons could be exempted from a facially neutral criminal law of
general applicability. The Court ruled they could not.
Reynolds v. United States 0 held that a person's religious convictions
were not grounds for an exemption from a criminal law. George Reynolds
was a resident of Utah and a practicing member of the Church of Latter
Day Saints. In accordance with his belief that his religion required
polygamy, he married a second time. Congress had outlawed polygamy
in 1862 in the Federal Territories, including the part of Utah in which
Reynolds lived. He was charged with violating the law, but he argued
that his action was protected by the First Amendment because he was
acting in conformity with a religious duty. The trial judge instructed the
jury that performing a religious duty did not exempt the person from
a criminal statute. He further warned the jury of the evils of polygamy.
After being found guilty by the jury, Reynolds appealed.
The Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Waite, looked to James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson to see what Congress could do. He noted
that Madison had argued that civil government could not intrude into
the field of opinion and belief, but it could regulate conduct which
threatened the civil order." Waite placed more reliance, however, on
Jefferson, who claimed that belief could not be regulated but conduct
could.' 2 This Jeffersonian distinction between belief and conduct, far less
restrictive of government action than Madison's understanding, became

9. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (applying test that examines the
purpose and effect of legislation as well as whether there is excessive entanglement of religion and
government).
10. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
11. Id. at 163.
12. Id. at 164.
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central to Free Exercise jurisprudence for over a half-century. 3 After
establishing that Congress could regulate marriage (at least in federal
territories), Waite rejected the claim that a religious belief required exemption from a criminal statute. Such an action, he said, could lead to
human sacrifices and other grave dangers. It would make religious doc-4
trines superior to the law of the land and each citizen a law to himself,'
an argument that would be renewed by Justice Scalia in the 1990 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith
case. 11
The Supreme Court followed up on the Reynolds decision twelve years
later in Davis v. Beason. 6 As with Reynolds, the Court held that polygamy
was a crime against all civilized and Christian countries, and that allowing
an exemption to this law would lead to all kinds of barbarous activities."
Justice Field, who wrote the majority opinion, said that to allow the
Mormon practice of polygamy offended the common sense of mankind."8
Field, like Justice Waite in Reynolds, continued the belief and conduct
distinction and held that the free exercise of religion was subordinate to
the criminal laws of the country.
For purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, the Mormon cases had two
important upshots for the exercise of Native American rights. The first
is the belief-conduct distinction. The second is the general treatment of
minority religious beliefs. As Michael McConnell has noted in his brilliant
historical analysis of the Free Exercise Clause, the belief-conduct distinction has only weak historical support. The distinction, says McConnell,
came originally from John Locke, who in his early writings stated that
individual conscience had to give way to legislative supremacy. 19 Reacting
against bitter religious strife in Europe, Locke initially wanted a strong
religious unity to remove competition among sects. 20 Later, he embraced
a far more sweeping toleration (except for Catholics), but his earlier
thought was adopted by Jefferson. Church-state jurisprudence from Reynolds until Cantwell v. Connecticut2' in 1940 embraced the belief-conduct

13. Justice Waite's second quotation of Jefferson was that of Jefferson's letter to the Baptist
church in Danbury, Connecticut, in which he said that there should be a "wall of separation"
between church and state. Id. This comment, never before used in court decisions, has (unfortunately)
become a church-state fundamental principle with little understanding of what Jefferson meant, and
how his intention squared with that of the other founders and the people who ratified the Constitution.
As A. James Reichley said, the phrase was a bomb that went off nearly sixty years later in Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See A. JAMEs REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE
(1985).
14. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
15. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). This decision, commonly known as the peyote case, allowed the State
of Oregon to deny unemployment benefits to two Native American drug counselors who had used
the hallucinogenic drug peyote as part of a worship ceremony. Id. at 874.
16. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
17. Id. at 343-45.
18. Id. at 341.
19. Michael W. McConnell, The Originsand HistoricalUnderstandingof Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1434 (1990).
20. Id. at 1432.
21. 310 U.S. 246 (1940).
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and its vitality was renewed (at least to some extent) in
distinction,
22
Smith.
The second point concerns the general treatment of religious minorities.
As Edwin Firmage has written, late nineteenth century Mormons lived
in a self-consciously Christian country. 23 Both sides of the Civil War,
for instance, firmly believed that they were God's agent fighting for the
cause of righteousness. 4 But the belief was not limited to political statements; there were judicial ones as well. For instance, in Vidal v. Girard's
Executor,25 Justice Story wrote that Christianity was part of the common
law.26 In Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 27 Justice Brewer wrote
that America was a Christian nation. 2 And Justice Douglas, in an oftengiven his jurisprudence, said that
cited and somewhat misleading passage
29
Americans are a religious people.
2. The Jehovah's Witnesses and the Amish
The major Free Exercise cases in the mid-twentieth century involved
the Jehovah's Witnesses, who brought a series of cases challenging laws,
particularly tax and registration laws, which burdened their ability to
evangelize. 0 Their claims were often tied up with a free speech claim,
3
which became grounds for Justice Scalia to distinguish them in Smith. 1
Two of those cases, and one Amish case, are worth considering because
they show a mid-twentieth century Supreme Court whose jurisprudence
was far more expansive than the current Court's.
Cantwell v. Connecticut12 is an important case in this area of jurisprudence. Cantwell was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses who was
evangelizing house to house in New Haven, Connecticut, with his two
sons. Each of them had books and pamphlets as well as a portable
phonograph and records describing the books. Cantwell asked the person
to whom he was talking for permission to play the record. If the listener
agreed, Cantwell would ask the person to buy the book and if the listener
refused, Cantwell would ask for a contribution to defray the costs of
the pamphlets. If the listener contributed, the pamphlet was given to
him on the condition that it would be read.33

See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Edwin B. Firmage, Free Exercise of Religion in Nineteenth Century America: The Mormon
7 J.L. & RELIG. 281, 282-86 (1989).
See Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in INAuGuRAL ADDRESSES
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 142-43 (1989).
25. 43 U.S. 127 (1844).
26. Firmage, supra note 23, at 281-82.
27. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
28. Firmage, supra note 23, at 283.
29. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14, (1952).
30. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103
(1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
31. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
32. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
33. See RICHRD McBRIEN, CAESAR'S CoN (1987), and A. J.As REiCL.EY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN
PUBLIC LIFE (1985), for summaries of many Supreme Court religion cases, including Cantwell.
22.
23.
Cases,
24.
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Ninety percent of the residents on a particular street where Cantwell
was soliciting were Catholic. One of the phonograph records described
a book entitled "Enemies," which attacked the Catholic faith. Cantwell
approached two men on a street and asked for permission to play the
record. Both men were Catholic and were incensed when they heard the
record. They told Cantwell to leave and one stated that he wanted to
hit him. Cantwell left immediately; no evidence was ever introduced to
show that Cantwell was ever personally offensive or argumentative.
Connecticut had passed a statute prohibiting any person from soliciting
money, services, subscriptions, or any other thing of value for alleged
religious, charitable, or philanthropic causes. The prohibition applied to
the solicitation of any person who was not a member of the solicitor's
religious, charitable, or philanthropic organization. The prohibition could
be lifted if the solicitor applied for a revocable certificate from a governmental council. The council was to determine whether the cause was
legitimately religious, charitable, or philanthropic. Connecticut arrested
Cantwell under the provisions of the statute. Cantwell claimed the law
violated his rights to freedom of speech and religion.
In Justice Roberts's majority opinion, the Court applied the Free
Exercise Clause to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment for the
first time.14 While citing the Jeffersonian language of Reynolds and Davis,
Roberts followed a more Madisonian line. He held that a state's regulation
of conduct had to be carefully limited. If the solicitation created a clear
and present danger then it could be regulated; however, the law could
only regulate the time, place, and manner of the solicitation. Justice
Roberts stated that since the Connecticut statute completely prohibited
a person's right to practice his religion by solicitation unless he had
government approval, it was censorship.3 5 Roberts further stated that
Cantwell had behaved peaceably and that there was no claim that he
intended to insult his listeners. There was, in fact, no clear and present
danger presented by Cantwell's actions. One may think that Cantwell
presented the first of a long line of cases which prevented governmental
enactment of laws which burdened religion. In fact, the Supreme Court
refused to grant an exemption or overturn a law which required students
to salute the American flag just a few weeks later.
In Minersville School District v. Gobitis,3 6 Justice Frankfurter held that
while a school's requirement to have its students salute the flag was not
a good law, the Court could not create an exemption from it. Using a
philosophy of judicial restraint, Frankfurter said that the Court had no
business saying what constitutional rights were more important than
others; the Court should apply the same constitutional standard to any
constitutional case. That standard, he said, was that if the legislature
had a rational reason to pass the legislation, the Court did not have the

34. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
35. Id. at 305-07.
36. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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authority to substitute its opinion. He characterized the legislative desire
reason; therefore, the requirement
to encourage patriotism as a rational
37
of a flag salute was constitutional.
As a result of Gobitis, several legislatures enacted or allowed subsidiary
governmental units to enact laws which also required mandatory flag
salutes. When Jehovah's Witnesses refused, many were beaten as well
as expelled from school. Only three years later, the Court overturned
the Gobitis decision in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette.3 8
In Barnette, the Board of Education required a stiff-armed salute to
foster ideals of Americanism and increased knowledge of government.
Refusal to salute the flag would lead to expulsion. Student members of
the Jehovah's Witnesses believed that the commands of God were superior
to the commands of the state and believed that saluting the flag violated
the Ten Commandment's prohibition against making a "graven image."
Upon expulsion from school, these children claimed that the law unconstitutionally denied their right to practice their religion freely.
Justice Jackson's majority opinion essentially held that any burden on
an individual's right to exercise freely his or her religion could only be
justified by a compelling government interest, and that any such regulation
had to be narrowly tailored to meet this objective.3 9 This commenced
the application of the compelling interest test to Free Exercise cases.
Why did the Court change from the Reynolds belief/conduct approach?
Part of the reason can be explained by the demographic and public faith
changes occurring in America. While the country was founded in a laissezfaire, largely rural environment, the mid-twentieth century saw the growth
of an urban society with an activist government. 40 Franklin Roosevelt
and the Congress had introduced the New Deal and the Supreme Court
was growing far more active, leaving justices like Frankfurter grasping
at arguments of self-restraint. The judiciary, as opposed to the legislature,
was increasingly viewed as the source of protection of minority rights,
contrary to what Frankfurter and his mentor, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
had argued should be the case. 4' Frankfurter's and Holmes's argument
was that the branch of government closest to the people was best suited
to protect constitutional rights. If that authority were taken away from
the people, they argued, moral decline would result as people viewed
themselves as unable to control the laws governing them. This tenet of
political theory, as well as the jurisprudential understanding of judicial
restraint, are important as harbingers of why today's Supreme Court
shies away from protecting minority rights, particularly the right to
government-created benefits, like welfare or unemployment compensation,
that did not exist at the time of the founding of the country.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
319
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 600.
U.S. 624 (1943).
at 639.
at 640.
at 646-71 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 42 members of the Amish faith refused to send
their children to school beyond the eighth grade, contrary to the Wisconsin
law requiring attendance until the age of sixteen. Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the majority, created an exemption for the Amish because
no overwhelming interest justified the Wisconsin requirement. The Amish
had a tradition of being good citizens, of providing a system of education
which encouraged hard work, reliability, self-reliance, and obedience to
the law.
In continuing to apply the compelling state interest test, it is fair to
ask if the Court's result would have been the same had the social context
been different or if, in fact, the Amish were a new religious order or
a law-defying one. Because they were not, and because they upheld many
traditional American values, it was easy for Burger to exempt them from
the Wisconsin law. With the exception of the unemployment benefits
cases, Yoder was the last Supreme Court case to create an exemption
from a law of general applicability.
3. The Unemployment Compensation Cases
Nearly a decade prior to Yoder, the Court applied its Free Exercise
rules to individuals who were denied unemployment benefits after being
fired for refusing to do certain work because of religion reasons. In
Sherbert v. Verner,43 the appellant was a member of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church. The Church firmly held that the Sabbath was to be
observed on a Saturday and that members should not work on that day.
The appellant refused to work on Saturdays and was fired by her employers. She sought other employment but employers would not hire her
because of her refusal to work on Saturdays. Unsuccessful in obtaining
employment, she filed a claim for unemployment benefits. Under South
Carolina law, a claimant was ineligible for benefits for refusing to accept
available, suitable work when it was offered. The South Carolina Unemployment Commission found that her refusal to take Saturday work
disqualified her from receiving benefits. The local state court and the
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the Commission's finding. The
appellant claimed that the provision abridged her right to exercise her
religion freely.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion held that the government could
neither compel nor penalize belief. Applying a more Madisonian form
of the compelling state interest test, he held that a governmental attempt
to do so could only be sustained by a substantial threat to the public
safety, peace, or order. In this case, he said, no such threat existed."
The most significant dissent was registered by Justice Stewart, who
correctly noted that the Court had violated its own Establishment Clause

42. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
43. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
44. Id. at 399-410.
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jurisprudence by favoring certain religions. 45 If the legislature had created
an exception for Seventh-Day Adventists, the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence would have forced it to strike it down. Stewart's argument
has been carried forward in similar Supreme Court cases on unemployment
benefits, particularly by Justice Rehnquist. 46 The argument, as McConnell
has noted, claims that the Court may not do what it tells the legislature
it cannot do. McConnell also notes that it is the Establishment Clause
47
exemption, and not the Free Exercise exemptions, which are in error.
In sum, when the Court considered three significant Native American
cases, a framework had already been established and then modified. Free
Exercise jurisprudence had been based on a Jeffersonian belief-conduct
distinction and was changed to allow the regulation of conduct only by
a compelling interest (and on occasion an even more Madisonian test of
upholding legislation only if an exemption threatened the public peace
and safety). The Court then applied the test to entitlement benefits, which
were not contemplated by the founders in a way that was at odds with
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Native Americans became the victims of the Court's attempts to clarify
its confused jurisprudence using conservative judicial self-restraint and,
perhaps, a jurisprudence of original intent. With the background of the
Court's jurisprudence in mind, three cases will be examined to see in
what condition the Court left the Free Exercise rights of Native Americans
and how the conservative Supreme Court has used originalism in its
decisions.
III.

SIGNIFICANT RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

The State of Native American Free Exercise Law
The past six years have witnessed a significant narrowing of the Supreme
Court's Free Exercise jurisprudence. Native Americans have caught the
brunt of that narrowing, beginning in 1986 with Bowen v. Roy. 4 8 Stephen
J. Roy and Karen Miller had applied and received benefits under the
Aid To Families With Dependent Children ("AFDC") and Food Stamps
programs. They refused, however, to furnish the social security number
of their two-year-old daughter, Little Bird of the Snow. They first claimed
that assigning a number to Little Bird would rob her of her spiritual
essence (both Roy and the government agreed that a number had never
been issued). When it later became evident that a social security number
had already been assigned, the parents sought to prevent any further use
of the number for the same spiritual reasons.
A.

45. Id. at 413-15 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
46. Frazee v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Employment Appeals
Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
Ind. Employment Sec. Div. 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. Michael McConnell & Richard Posner, Economics and Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 33 (1989).
48. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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Congress required states to obtain a recipient's social security number.
Because Roy refused to obtain a number for his daughter, the relevant
Pennsylvania agencies terminated AFDC and medical benefits and sought
to reduce the level of food stamps provided to the household. Roy then
instituted a suit, claiming that the only reason the benefits were denied
was because of the refusal to obtain (or later use) the social security
number. Roy claimed that conditioning eligibility on providing a social
security number violated his free exercise of religion.
Chief Justice Burger, writing the plurality opinion for a splintered
court, said that the governmental requirement of a social security number
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because it did not require Roy,
by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct (as
it often had in Jehovah's Witnesses cases), or to engage in conduct that
he found objectionable (as had been the case in Yoder and Barnette);
thus, there was no constitutional infringement on Free Exercise. 49 Essentially, Burger was arguing that when the government distributed benefits, it stood on a different constitutional platform than if it was punishing
belief or conduct in some other form. How did Burger arrive at this
conclusion?
Burger at least paid some attention to the original meaning of the
Constitutional provision, albeit in a cursory manner. Citing a scholarly
study of the history of the First Amendment,5 ° he said that granting
benefits was "far removed from the historical instances of religious
persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment."'" The denial of benefits,
he wrote, was far less intrusive than affirmative compulsion or prohibition
2
by threat of penal sanctions of religiously motivated conduct.1
3 in
Burger also cited Hamilton v. Regents of University of California,
which the Court held against a Free Exercise claim by students who were
opposed to taking military courses as part of their curriculum in a state
university. Because the students had voluntarily decided to utilize a
government benefit, the Court held, the students' liberties were not
5 4
violated by prescribing specific courses which offended religious opinions.
In contrast, said Burger, in Barnette (and Yoder) a requirement that
offended religious opinion in conjunction with a forced attendance was
at issue.55
Burger concluded that in judging a facially neutral and uniformly
applicable requirement for a wide-raging public benefit, the government
was entitled to wide latitude and did not have to be evaluated according

49. Id. at 703.
50. Id. (citing MICHAEL
THE FIRST AMENDMENT

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

MALBIN,

(1978)).

Id.
Id. at 704.
293 U.S. 245 (1934).
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 704.
Id. at 705.

RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF
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to the compelling state interest test.16 How did he square that conclusion
with the Sherbert line of cases? Justice Burger reasoned that the Sherbert
line of cases were a protection against unequal treatment of religious
sects. In Bowen, however, there were no exceptions at all-everyone must
provide a social security number; thus, all citizens were treated equally
and no religious exemption was required.57 Finally, Burger noted that
the legislature could create religious accommodations, but the Court could
not. The Court simply decided that the legislature's attempt to reduce
welfare fraud met the test of proving a "legitimate and important public
interest," and the requirement was constitutional even if it burdened the
8
religious practices of Roy and his family.1
Several justices saw the case as nothing more than another Sherberttype controversy and therefore dissented from the Court's holding.5 9
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, more fully
objected to Burger's treatment of the case. O'Connor applied the compelling state interest test. She, like Chief Justice Burger, paid scant
attention to what the framers may have intended. Instead, she focused
on the requirement of showing a compelling interest whenever a governmental action burdens a person's exercise of religious freedom. 60 She
claimed that Hamilton was inapplicable because it was decided prior to
the time the Court had applied the Free Exercise Clause to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the Hamilton Court was
simply conducting a generalized analysis of whether the state's policy
6
would deprive students of life, liberty, or property. '
Further (and here is reached what is perhaps the crux of this line of
First Amendment jurisprudence), she noted that the Court could not
apply a different standard to entitlements than it does to other governmental action. Citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 62 she said: "[Welfare] benefits
are a matter of statutory entitlement .... The Constitutional challenge
cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are
'a "privilege" and not a "right." ' ",63 If entitlements are only a privilege,
then the government could more easily restrict their receipt than if they
are a right. In her only appeal to the founders, she argued that even if
they did not live in a welfare state, they constructed a society which
limited the government's actions. Simply because a welfare state now
exists does not mean that the Free Exercise Clause thereby ceases to
exist. 64 In other words, the same standards should apply to entitlements.
O'Connor conceded that the government had a compelling interest in

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 708.
Id.
Id. at 709-12.
Id. at 713 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting); see also id. at 733 (White, J.,dissenting).
Id. at 727 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
Id.at 730.
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 731 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)).
Id. at 732 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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preventing welfare fraud, but since the65means were not narrowly tailored,
the requirement was unconstitutional.
The Bowen decision, while creating some exceptionally narrow distinctions, did not create large controversy. In part, that may have been
the result of the questionable sincerity of the beliefs at issue. The opinion
indicates that Roy's beliefs were developed recently (his other children
had social security numbers). Moreover, requiring a number seems like
a small imposition in American culture, which does not acknowledge the
spiritual importance that might be affected. If the beliefs were sincere,
however, it is hard to see how this does not force participation in an
activity found religiously objectionable. The same lack of acknowledgement was also present in 1988.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,6 the United
States Forest Service planned to permit road construction and timber
harvesting in areas of the national forest that had been used by Native
Americans for religious purposes. In 1982, the Forest Service conducted
a study to determine the impact of the planned construction. It determined
that the entire area '[was] significant as an integral and indispensable
part of Indian religious conceptualization and practice.' ' ' 7 Nevertheless,
the Forest Service selected the route traversing the area. Alternative routes
were rejected as they too crossed sacred land, and additionally would
have caused environmental problems and would have necessitated the
purchase of private lands. The selected route avoided archaeological sites
and was removed from the areas used for spiritual purposes. In addition,
the management plan for harvesting timber created protective zones around
the identified religious zones. The Native Americans claimed that building
the road would deprive them of sacred grounds necessary for the practice
of their religion and would therefore violate the Free Exercise Clause.6
The Court, through Justice O'Connor, held that the Free Exercise
Clause did not prohibit the government from allowing timber harvesting
and road construction in the area. The majority held that the Free Exercise
Clause was written to protect individuals from certain forms of governmental interference. It did not, however, give individuals the right to
control the internal workings of the government. The Free Exercise Clause
is written in terms of a limitation on government action, not in terms
of what the individual can exact from the government. The majority
observed that, with a government of the United States' magnitude, any
governmental action is likely to offend one or another group of citizens.
Justice O'Connor further discussed the Free Exercise Clause by acknowledging that, while the road construction and the timber harvesting may
indeed interfere with the Native American spiritual practices, it did not
force them to violate their religious practices and was therefore legal.

65. Id.
66. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
67. Id. at 442 (quoting a United States Forest Service Study).
68. This case has spawned several law review articles and case notes, such as W, Pemble
DeLashmet, Note, The Indian Wars Continued, 10 Miss. C. L. REV. 79 (1989).
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The Court also noted that the Forest Service had taken extra steps to
minimize the negative impact of the construction on the Native American
spiritual activities.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented.
He said that the majority acknowledged that the construction directly
and substantially threatened religion, but allowed it anyway. He cited
several cases, among them Wisconsin v. Yoder, 69 where the government
protected individuals from an action whose impact may restrain religious
practices. Justice Brennan said that the majority's reading of the Free
Exercise Clause fell short of the protection historically provided and
argued that any action of the government that frustrated one's ability
70
to practice religion should be disallowed by the Free Exercise Clause.
As happened in Bowen, the categories established for Free Exercise
protection did not match the Native American categories. The Court
assumes that an individual chooses his beliefs. That is one reason the
Court can be comfortable in regulating conduct in one form or another
but not in regulating belief. The assumption that an individual chooses
his beliefs does not account for a religious tradition, firmly established,
that is based on a relationship profoundly embedded in nature and that
is essentially not subject to choice. To argue, as the Court does, that
citizens cannot tell government what to do with the government's land
is to impose a category totally foreign to Native Americans, for whom
real estate ownership is non-existent. Likewise, to say that the action
does not force compliance with a belief ignores the fact that to acknowledge the legitimacy of the government's (and culture's) categories
is to act against Native American beliefs.7" This is not to say that the
Court erred; rather, it is to say that the Court's categories are themselves
inevitably defined by the underlying American culture and public faith.
This means that the protection of minority rights such as those of Native
Americans relies on more than Supreme Court activity, a theme which
will be returned to later in this article.
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith, 72 two Native American substance abuse counselors were fired
for using the hallucinogenic drug peyote during worship services of the
Native American Church. The two subsequently filed for unemployment
benefits, but the Oregon commission denied their claim, viewing their
dismissal as work-related misconduct.
The substance abuse counselors, Smith and Black, filed suit claiming
that the denial of the benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause. Justice

69. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
70. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 468, n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Several commentators have addressed these issues, such as Robert S. Michaelsen, American
Indian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promise and Perils, 3 J.L. & RELIG. 47 (1985); Howard
Stambor, Manifest Destiny and American Indian Religious Freedom: Seqoyah, Badoni and the
Drowned Gods, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 59 (1982); Dean B. Savage, American Indian Religious
Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 Am. INDIAN L. REv.
1 (1982).
72. 494 U.S 872 (1990).
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O'Connor, concurring in the result, applied the compelling state interest
test but found that the battle against drugs was a compelling enough
governmental interest to sustain the Oregon law. 3 Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan, dissented. He too adhered to
the compelling state interest test, but said that what must be applied
was not whether the government had an interest in battling drugs, but
whether it had a compelling interest in outlawing peyote. Blackmun noted
that several states specifically made an exception for peyote, which he
thought was a reason for questioning exactly how compelling the legislation
was.7 4 Blackmun also cited evidence from the trial that showed that peyote
had not been shown to harm anyone, that there was practically no illegal
trafficking of peyote, and that the Native American Church condemned
the non-religious use of peyote. In short, he found no compelling reason
for the state to deny an exemption for the religious use of peyote and,
thus, it unconstitutionally burdened the Free Exercise of religion.
Both Blackmun and O'Connor were reacting to the majority opinion
of Justice Scalia. Scalia said that under the Free Exercise Clause the
government may not directly prohibit an activity because of its religious
nature. Scalia emphasized, however, that the Constitution protected only
legitimate claims to the Free Exercise Clause. Because the State of Oregon
had ruled the use of peyote criminal without creating any exemption,
the counselors were rightfully denied unemployment benefits.
More importantly, Scalia rejected the use of the strict scrutiny/compelling state interest test. Scalia did not justify his opinion on the basis
of what the founders may have intended, which is somewhat strange
given Scalia's commitment to a jurisprudence of original intent; however,
the themes of his opinion clearly reflect the philosophies of judicial
restraint and originalism. Scalia rejected the notion that the text of the
First Amendment requires the finding that an individual is entitled to
an exemption from generally applicable law for religious reasons. Instead,
Scalia believed that the text may also be read to allow a governmental
burden on the Free Exercise of religion if it only incidentally burdens
a generally applicable law.75 This Reynolds-like deference to legislative
action paved the way to uphold the regulation's legitimacy. Citing Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Gobitis, Scalia stated that religious convictions
do not relieve a citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities
such as observing generally applicable laws. He supported this claim with
citations from Reynolds7 6 and said that the only time that the Court has
allowed an exemption is when the Free Exercise claim is accompanied
by another constitutional claim, such as free speech or the rights of
parents to select the preferred method of educating their children. 7 Justice

73. Id. at 904 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
74. Id. at 912, n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 878.
76. For a discussion of the parallels between Reynolds and Smith, see Theresa Cook, The Peyote
Case: A Return To Reynolds, 68 DENV. U. L. REV. 91 (1991).
77. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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Scalia argued that the Smith case did not present such a hybrid situation.
He also limited Sherbert to the unemployment field, where the state
has allowed for the extension of benefits for non-religious as well as
religious reasons. Noting that the Court had refused to apply the compelling interest test in Bowen and Lyng, and asserting Reynolds-like
distinctions, Scalia said that applying the test in this case would provide
a private right to ignore generally applicable laws, which showed the
Sherbert lines of cases to be a constitutional anomaly. 78 Claiming that
such a private right of action would lead to constitutional exemptions
of every conceivable kind, he suggested a parade of horribles which could
result from these exemptions: the non-payment of taxes; disregard of
health and safety regulations; and disobedience of compulsory vaccination
laws, traffic laws, child labor laws, and many others.7 9 If an exemption
is to be created, he said, the legislative branch should do it. This, he
acknowledged, may place minorities at a political disadvantage, but that
is the unavoidable consequence of a democratic government, which is
preferable to having judges weigh the social importance of all laws against
the centrality of all religious beliefs.80 Thus, by espousing notions of
judicial deference to the legislature, limiting previous holdings to their
narrowest possible meaning, distinguishing entitlement cases as being on
a different constitutional plane, and creating worry about opening the
floodgates to anarchy, Scalia held the Oregon unemployment statute
constitutional.
The real dissent in the Smith case came not from Scalia's colleagues,
but from the academic commentators. Douglas Laycock observes that
regardless of the formulation, the Oregon statute required a believer to
choose between religious belief and governmental benefits . 8a That criticism
is echoed and expanded upon by Michael McConnell.8 2 McConnell's
strongest arguments concern the historical posture of exemptions at the
time of the nation's founding. Noting that, unlike the Establishment
Clause, no one on the Court really took the time to examine what the
founders may have intended, McConnell argues that the Free Exercise
Clause was primarily the result of a drive by religious evangelicals to
claim exemptions from generally applicable laws on the basis of religious
conscience. 3 In particular, McConnell shows that there were many exemptions which existed at the time of the ratification of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. The exemption from taking an oath, from military

78. Id. at 886.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 890.
81. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise and the Amicus Brief That
Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIG. 99 (1990).
82. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1109 (1990). Much of McConnell's argument came from his Harvard Law Review article
published at the time of the Smith decision. See McConnell, supra note 19. Consequently, much
of the Chicago article is based on the Harvard study. To grasp McConnell's criticism of Smith,
one should read both articles.
83. McConnell, supra note 19, at 1410;

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

conscription, from religious assessments, from wearing a hat in court,
and from requiring marriage in a Christian church, were all examples
of laws from which the legislature provided an exemption for religious
minorities. 4 McConnell thus argues that the idea of exemptions from a
generally applicable law was well known by the founders. He further
argues that not allowing exemptions misunderstands the founders' belief
that God was sovereign. This sovereignty created an obligation for a
believer to be obedient to God first and only thereafter to obey civil
law. In particular, he cites James Madison, who said that men are first
subject to the Governor of the Universe, and then to civil society. 5 Thus,
where religious conscience requires a believer to refrain from obeying the
law, the founders fully understood that an exemption could be granted.
McConnell believes that there is historical support to substantiate the
theory that exemptions were well known to the founders, and thus the
Court has ample justification for creating exemptions for Smith and
others.
McConnell's historical study is impressive, but it does not solve the
problem because it does not address the underlying issues in Scalia's
opinion. Scalia's difficulty with the exemptions are addressed below.
While the legislature may create exemptions, it is not clear that the
Court may. This is a question of judicial restraint, which, even more
than determining the specific or original intent about exemptions, goes
to the fundamental notion of what the Court is authorized to do. Thus,
while McConnell is correct that Scalia and the other justices do not
carefully ask what the founders may have meant, it is still not clear,
and in fact it is doubtful, that under Scalia's view the Court could
constitutionally create the requested exemption.
Even if the Court were authorized to create exemptions, it is not clear
that the Court must do so for welfare benefits. Because the founders
were not confronted with the demands of the welfare state, it is at least
an arguable construction of original intent that the Court is not authorized
to create an exemption concerning a government benefit. Yet, as long
as Shapiro is good law and entitlements are rights and not privileges,
and as long as the compelling state interest test has been consistently
applied to Free Exercise cases (particularly in the realm of unemployment
benefits), Scalia has tenuous precedential bases for implying that welfarestate entitlements stand on a less-protected ground.
Underlying Scalia's reasoning is a reaction against the thought that the
Free Exercise Clause should not require what the Establishment Clause
does not allow. 8 6 McConnell notes this does not require a restriction of
the Free Exercise Clause, but does require a proper understanding of the
Establishment Clause. As Richard John Neuhaus has written, both the
Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses are about freedom of religion;
the Establishment Clause is simply a means to prevent governments from

84. Id. at 1466-69.
85. McConnell, supra note 82, at 1151-52.
86. See McConnell & Posner, supra note 47, at 33.
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intruding upon one's free exercise. 87 More specifically, McConnell's analysis proves that a legislative exemption which would be unconstitutional
under today's Establishment Clause was directly contemplated and approved of by the founders. This does not solve the issue of court-created
exemptions, but it shows that exemptions themselves are not a constitutional problem (although the source of the exemptions may be).
The test applied to Free Exercise cases has been misguided in two
respects. First, the test is not the same test applied in equal protection
cases, where it is virtually impossible to prove a compelling interest.
Instead, as O'Connor (as well as Blackmun) indicate in their opinions,
preventing fraud in welfare programs or fighting illegal drug trafficking
are "compelling" enough to justify burdening Free Exercise rights, provided the means are drawn narrowly enough. This leaves Free Exercise
rights in a rather subjective posture of determining exactly what is compelling, or, more accurately, what is a significant or important government
interest. While one may be able to argue that different constitutional
provisions require different tests, the different tests should at least be
differently named to prevent unnecessary confusion. Second, the substitution of Madison's public safety test is much more precise and historically
more accurate for judicial application. McConnell has shown that Madison's test was more common than Jefferson's belief-conduct test, and
is therefore entitled to more judicial respect.
The current Court seems intent on returning to a Frankfurtarian jurisprudence in which the Court will defer to any reasonable legislative
action rather than require a compelling interest. This philosophy, again
part of a more fundamental dispute about the role of the Court, creates
little protection of minorities by the courts. It also threatens to swing
the pendulum of First Amendment law back to a state in which the
Supreme Court has little role in checking the other branches of government, let alone in protecting minority rights.
Where does this leave the rights of Native Americans? Presently, it
leaves them very much endangered. The Rehnquist Court probably will
not create any exemption from a generally applicable law because it has
held that the government has not created any exemptions which demand
equal treatment of religions or demand equal treatment between the
nonreligious and religious (Bowen). Furthermore, by refusing to recognize
religious exemptions for internal matters of the government (Lyng), and
unemployment benefits (Smith), the Rehnquist Court demonstrated it is
not likely to extend constitutional protection through a court-created
exemption. Moreover, the Court has not yet modified its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence cases to guarantee that legislative correction of the
exemption problem will be sustained. Under current standards, a legislative
exemption for religious reasons would unconstitutionally endorse or prefer
a particular religion. Thus, Native Americans are left with virtually no

87. Richard John Neuhaus, Contending for the Future: Overcoming the Pfefferian Inversion, 8
J.L. & RELIG. 115, 116 (1990).
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relief from generally applicable laws that impinge on their religious
practices.
Does original jurisprudence mandate this? To use other terminology,
assuming that Native Americans were not granted exemptions by the
founders, is there a theory of original jurisprudence which does allow
such protection? There are at least three ways in which it could provide
such protection. First, one could argue that McConnell has proven that
the founders considered and endorsed such exemptions. In its role as
protector of minority interests (a role which may not be embraced by
today's Court), the Court could uphold the right to entitlement benefits
as consistent with an interpretive jurisprudence. Second, one could argue
that correcting current Establishment Clause jurisprudence to allow legislative exemptions could allow for an originalist protection of minority
rights. Given the Court's favorable comments toward legislative activity,
this could be a distinct possibility. If so, minorities could then receive
legislative protection for their Free Exercise rights. This is likely to be
the best possibility for the protection of Native American Free Exercise
rights. Third, one can argue that modern Court jurisprudence has established that the Courts do have a responsibility for protecting the rights
of minorities. The Court could create exemptions from generally applicable
laws on the Madisonian public safety test. Such an approach allows the
Court to answer the judicial restraint position, articulated by Justice
Frankfurter in Gobitis, that the Court should be consistent in applying
its constitutional standards. Applying the public safety standard may not
only be more accurate from a Free Exercise standpoint, but also accords
better with other First Amendment standards such as free speech and
assembly. This more precise standard would also blunt Scalia's "floodgates" concerns.
Thus, the return of the Court to an originalist, interpretative body
does not necessarily preclude the protection of minority rights. As the
law stands, one cannot be positive that the Court will take the steps
necessary to provide Free Exercise protection of Native Americans and
other minorities. Returning the Court to a posture where it can protect
minorities would require several things. First, it would require a definitive
understanding of the rights to entitlement in this country. Those rights,
once definitively established in Shapiro, now seem to be in doubt in
Smith. Reaffirming the right to entitlements certainly would clarify much
of the dispute of the Free Exercise cases; even a rejection of such a
right would establish the playing field upon which other actions can be
taken. Second, it would require a definitive understanding of the degree
of discretion to which the legislature is entitled. Third, it would require
a consistent application of a Free Exercise Clause test. While either a
compelling state interest test or Madison's clear and present danger test
seem most consistent with the notion of the Bill of Rights, any consistent
approach at least defines the terms for other protective action. Fourth,
it would require a proper interpretation of the relationship between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Otherwise, there is
little likelihood that the Free Exercise Exemption, whether legislatively
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or judicially created, can ever be implemented. Finally, it would require
a better understanding of the role of the legislature and general public
in providing for minority protection.
Questions of basic jurisprudence are beyond the scope of this article.
There is, however, a way to improve church-state jurisprudence generally
and to explore the legislative and public dimensions of the protection of
the Free Exercise rights of Native Americans.
IV.

POSSIBLE METHODS OF PROTECTING THE FREE
EXERCISE RIGHTS OF NATIVE AMERICANS

Protection of Minority Rights Through Application of the
Establishment Clause
The first way to protect the rights of minorities, given the existing
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, is to clarify the correct application
of the Establishment Clause. While far too complex to analyze fully in
this article, it is worth noting that a great deal of headway can be made
by analyzing the functional things permitted and prohibited by the Establishment Clause. By looking at more generalized principles of the
founders, rather than specific language that often turns into slogans rather
than principle, one can see the evil to be prevented by the First Amendment. 8 The Establishment Clause was basically designed to promote and
protect human dignity by checking the growth of arbitrary power. The
Constitution, through its checks and balances, was designed to ensure
that no one person or group acquires too much power.8 9
Religion and the government's relation to it could create excessive
power by providing a direct monetary link between the two institutions,
and through governmental coercion of religious institutions. A symbolic
association was clearly contemplated by the founders (note the number
of legislative prayers and other symbolic associations of religion and
government), but coercive and monetary interaction would violate the
Establishment of religion and the founders' conceptions of human dignity.
It would also create a combination of religious and governmental power
that violates the Constitutional attempt to restrain arbitrary power.
If that is the case, then there is little reason to oppose legislativelycreated exemptions (leaving aside the fact that the Supreme Court seems
unwilling to endorse or sponsor judicially-created exemptions). No monetary support passes between government and religion, except through a
neutral program in the case of entitlement benefits. Coercion is removed.
Any symbolic "endorsement" of a particular faith would be justified by
the exemptions McConnell has argued were a part of the founders'
intentions. In short, analyzing the Establishment Clause by a functional
A.

88. For instance, the use of Jefferson's comment about a "Wall of Separation" between church
and state has been elevated into a talismanic absolute with little judicial explanation of why it
should be. See McConnell & Posner, supra note 47, at 33.
89. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 142 (1980).
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approach balances both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and
removes the conflict between the two. °
Protection of Minority Rights Through a "Prophetic" Role
A second judicial method of protecting these rights comes from Michael
Perry. 9' Perry argues that an interpretative jurisprudence is preferential
to a non-interpretive jurisprudence. Perry argues that because legislatures
consistently duck controversial issues, there is a void in the protection
of human rights (particularly of minorities) that the Court may fill in
a "prophetic" role. The role of the prophet, he argues, is to call the
people to judgment here and now. 92 By this he means that the prophet
(in his view the Court) must show the people their shortcomings as part
of the national process of deepening our moral knowledge as to what
human rights are all about. Such an approach may create uncomfortable
feelings, as is usually the case when someone points out another's shortcomings; however, Perry believes the Court is uniquely situated to be
above political pressure and should fulfill this role.
Perry understands that a prophet calls the people to judgment on behalf
of another and does so in spite of great difficulty and severe personal
risk. 93 Applying that understanding to the Court, Perry would have the
Court call the nation to judgment on behalf of the Constitution's moral
principles. The difficulty is that a prophet does not seek to become the
ruler, as ruling corrupts the legitimacy of the prophet's disinterested
authority. 94 If the Supreme Court becomes the unchecked authority for
human rights cases, it then becomes the ruler. That is exactly why Supreme
Court nomination hearings have become so contentious-they have filled
not a prophetic but a ruling role. By being a ruler, the Court has
subjected itself to the quest for power that inevitably follows and calls
into question the disinterested discussion of moral-political issues. Thus,
B.

90. Although it requires a far more detailed article, McConnell and Posner's attempt to use
economic principles to evaluate the burdens placed on the Free Exercise of religion and those placed
on the government, as well as Establishment Clause allocation of aid to public schools, may be
helpful in providing useful criteria for First Amendment jurisprudence. Generally, I am rather
dubious about the application of economic principles to human rights cases (of which the Religion
Clauses would be an example) simply because the economic principles (as McConnell and Posner
recognize) require a base line establishment of values. Economics cannot decide those values, but,
once established, can neutrally apply them. The difficulty is that economics is essentially a form
of utilitarianism, which immediately associates a value-system inevitably defining the base-line values.
Utilitarianism may well be the most appropriate decision-making tool for government, provided that
human rights are somehow valued correctly (whatever that may mean); however, economics is not
as neutral as its authors would have us believe. Nevertheless, if base-line values of the Religion
Clauses can be established, for instance along the lines of a public dignity which requires the free
exercise of religion and restraint of arbitrary power, then the tools of economics analysis may
correctly identify what benefits and burdens are being placed on religious institutions and on
individuals seeking to exercise their religious freedom. See McConnell & Posner, supra note 47, at
1.
91.

MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,

THE COURTS AND

HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).

92. Id. at 98.
93. See RICHARD MCBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 230 (1980).
94. 1 admit that this definition of prophecy is a Judeo-Christian one and is vulnerable to attack,
particularly from an Islamic point of view.
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if the Court is to exercise a prophetic role, it must exercise tremendous
self-restraint or else it will lose its ability to be prophetic. In fact, it
may well be impossible to fulfill both roles. If so, those who call the
country back to its moorings, those who insist that the country live up
to the ideals enunciated by the Constitution, those who would assure
Free Exercise rights to Native Americans, must be someone else. Who
is that someone else?
Simply put, that someone else is the people. On political-moral-legal
matters, it is people like Perry and McConnell. More structurally, it is
the legislatures. 9 The founders, together with Holmes and Frankfurter,
were not wrong in arguing that the legislatures should be the bodies best
suited to ensure the protection of minorities. While Scalia is correct in
noting that relying on legislatures may place minorities at a relative
disadvantage, that is only to the extent that the real prophets sleep. Once
the right to decide those issues is taken away from the people, there is
an inevitable popular alienation which leads to voter apathy, increasing
pursuit of narrow self-interest, and moral degeneration.
In The Fatal Conceit,9 6 F.A. Hayek (primarily addressing the economic
error of socialism, but also considering the question of morality in society)
said that the fatal conceit of society is to think people can simply change
the rules of human nature by rational thought. Instead, he argues that
the slow, evolutionary knowledge of tradition contains a wisdom of moral
truth that is far more profound than rationalism.
Jacques Ellul, coming from an entirely different perspective in The
Theological Foundation of Law, 97 argued that human beings can never
create a perfect society; only God can. The most just society that can
be produced is one in which the people spontaneously understand what
is right and wrong without excessive action by the government.
Both of these scholars recognize the truth implied by the founders, by
Justices Holmes, Frankfurter, and Scalia, and probably by a majority
of the current Supreme Court. Simply put, the promotion and protection
of human dignity and human rights, among them the Free Exercise of
religion by minorities, comes about through a public faith which is not
imposed but is the result of history and the action of non-governmental
sources. The government and the Court's changes of attitude from Reynolds to Cantwell to Sherbert to Smith reflects society's values. The
commitment to the Constitution and its wisdom is part of that reflection.

95. There have been modern legislative attempts to restore Native American rights, such as the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. IV 1980). For descriptions and
analysis, see Kristen L. Boyles, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 Proposed Amendment to the American
Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1117 (1991); Ellen M.W. Sewell The American Religious
Freedom Act, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 429 (1983); Rex P. Craven, Note, The American Indian Religious
Freedom Act-An Answer to the Indians' Prayers?, 29 S.D.L. REV. 131 (1983); Robin K. Rannow,
Religion: The First Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 10 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 151 (1983).
96. FRtEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT (1988).
97. JACQUES ELLUL, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF LAW (1969) (translated by Marguerite

Wieser).
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Part of it is the public perception of those constitutional values. Those
values can be articulated by the Supreme Court; however, the Court
itself relies on a public faith that defines the nature of those rights.
The dependence on a public faith need not, however, transform itself
into a Critical Legal Studies textbook case of morality serving the whims
of the powerful. What is historically reflected is that the normative public
faith is stronger and deeper than any individual or group can manipulate.
The significance of this for the protection of the Free Exercise rights
of religious minorities is three-fold. First, the primary responsibility for
those rights belongs to the people and to the "prophets" who call the
people to live up to the ideals that founded the country.98 Among the
most basic of constitutional protections is to protect the "sacred sources"
which nurture moral responsibility, a fact well-understood by the founders.
Second, as the closest representative of the people, the legislature not
only has the proper role to protect the right of minorities, but may be
forced to do so by the current Court. Third, the Court, in conjunction
with the shouldering of responsibility by the people and the legislature,
then has plenty of original sources to protect the rights of minorities
while remaining fully consistent with an original interpretation of the
Constitution.
V.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in the past six years, the
rights of Native Americans to exercise their religion freely are gravely
threatened, if not non-existent. The Court is not likely to provide protection insofar as unemployment benefits (and probably other entitlements)
are concerned. Nor are there any judicial grounds to believe that a
legislatively-created exemption will not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Court's embrace of a conservative jurisprudence is founded on
doctrines of judicial deference to legislature, a vague reliance on only
allowing legislative exemptions, and an underlying hostility toward entitlements. While one can argue that judicially-created exemptions are
constitutional if one accepts the role of the Court to be the primary
protector of minority rights, the modern Court appears to believe that
such a role more appropriately belongs to the legislative branch, and
believes in the development of a public faith among the general populace.
That development will not occur by the imposition of a moral judgment
by the Court, but only by the active involvement of people. That prospect,
given the current state of legislative cowardice and popular apathy, is
frightening, but ultimately is the best way to ensure a measure of moral
legitimacy. Thus, while the Free Exercise rights of Native Americans are

98. I recognize that in a democracy the people are really sovereign, so one could argue that
my criticism of Perry-that the prophet cannot become ruler-can be applied to my construction
of prophecy as well. Yet the point that no individual or group should both exercise the power of
government and be the prophets correctly understands the legitimization of disinterested authority
that the prophet needs.
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not likely to obtain protection from the Supreme Court if the Court is
the only body so protecting them, there does exist a possibility for the
protection of those rights from other institutions, which can in turn be
sanctioned by a conservative Court.

